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Introduction 
The First Amendment provides the language for the Free Exercise 
Clause: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”1 Although the 
definition of religion and the scope of the Free Exercise Clause have 
been the subject of much contention for centuries, the last decade has 
seen a drastic shrinkage in the scope of the Free Exercise Clause and 
in the protection of individuals’ rights to freely practice their religion 
in the face of governmental regulations.2 The deflation of the Free 
Exercise Clause was initiated by the United States Supreme Court in 
its 1990 decision Employment Division, Department of Human 
Resources of Oregon v. Smith,3 which the Court subsequently 
affirmed in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of 
Hialeah.4 Now we are faced with a fundamental constitutional 
question: What is left of the Free Exercise Clause? Because case law 
and scholarly discussion regarding the scope of the Free Exercise 
Clause vary greatly,5 this question requires further examination. 
The scope of this Comment narrowly reviews and addresses a 
qualification to the generally accepted Smith rule known as the hybrid-
rights exception, which states that free exercise claims are deserving of 
heightened scrutiny if they are combined with an independent, con-
stitutional claim. This doctrine, developed by the Supreme Court in 
 
1. U.S. Const. amend. I.  
2. See Hope Lu, Note, Mandatory Vaccinations Within the Schoolhouse 
Gate: How a Law-Medicine Perspective and the Hybrid-Rights Exception 
Salvage a Right to Religious Exemptions, 63 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2013) (documenting the historical changes regarding the 
Supreme Court’s narrowing of the Free Exercise Clause). However, the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church and School v. EEOC raises a contention, the discussion of which 
is outside the scope of this Comment, that the Supreme Court has 
revived the Free Exercise Clause to a certain extent. See Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 707 
(2012) (holding that a ministerial exception grounded in the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment existed and applied in an employment 
discrimination case, barring the government from interfering with a 
religious group’s decision to fire one of its ministers). 
3. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
4. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 
(1993). 
5. See infra Part I; see also William P. Marshall, The Case Against the 
Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 Case W. Res. 
L. Rev. 357, 411 (1990) (arguing against the constitutionally compelled 
free exercise exemption because it “sets forth a false dichotomy between 
secular and religious belief systems and ignores the similarity of their 
functions . . . in the political and social environment”).  
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Smith, has caused courts and legal scholars to suffer considerable 
confusion and criticism. Some courts have contended that since the 
hybrid-rights exception is dicta in Smith, courts should wait until the 
Supreme Court provides more guidance. Other courts have attempted 
to apply the hybrid-rights exception but have not done so successfully. 
A few courts have even stated that the hybrid-rights theory is illogical 
and have criticized the Smith majority for seeking to distinguish Smith 
from precedent using the hybrid-rights exception. 
This Comment addresses the hybrid-rights qualification to the 
Smith axiom and argues for a specific approach to the hybrid-rights 
exception through a novel set of lenses. Part I introduces the current 
free exercise legal framework and the hybrid-rights exception. Part II 
presents the lower courts’ confusion with interpreting the Supreme 
Court’s hybrid-rights exception. Part III suggests a novel view for how 
the hybrid-rights doctrine should be interpreted. This Comment con-
cludes by arguing that the hybrid-rights theory can breathe life back into 
the Free Exercise Clause so long as courts apply strict scrutiny to  state 
action that restricts the free exercise of religion where the action gives 
rise to a separate, colorable, and interdependent constitutional claim. 
I. The Hybrid-Rights Controversy 
The constitutional definition of religion and the scope of the Free 
Exercise Clause have been controversial topics.6 This Part reviews the 
current status of the Supreme Court’s free exercise framework, which 
sets forth the basic axiom of Smith and then the qualifications to 
Smith: (1) the Hialeah exception, (2) the individualized exemption, 
and (3) the hybrid-rights exception. 
A. The Basic Axiom of Free Exercise Jurisprudence  
The basic axiom of free exercise jurisprudence is found in 
Employment Division v. Smith, which held that the Free Exercise 
Clause cannot be used to challenge a neutral law of general 
applicability.7 Smith, however, was seen by many as a drastic change 
from the decades of Supreme Court free exercise jurisprudence before 
it.8 Some commentators subscribe to the idea that free exercise rights 
 
6. See Lu, supra note 2 (explaining the controversy surrounding the Free 
Exercise Clause in the context of mandatory vaccinations). 
7. Smith, 494 U.S. 872. 
8. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, Employment Division v. Smith at the 
Supreme Court: The Justices, the Litigants, and the Doctrinal 
Discourse, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 1671, 1671 & n.2 (2011) (“Since it was 
decided twenty years ago, many commentators, both scholarly and 
otherwise, have characterized Employment Division v. Smith as a 
dramatic, unjustified departure from previous free exercise cases.” 
(footnote omitted)).  
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received vigorous strict scrutiny protection before Smith and that 
Smith was a radical departure from previous precedent.9 Other 
scholars and courts have argued that the standard in Smith was the 
same as the standard in most cases even prior to the 1990 decision.10 
Regardless of the camp to which one subscribes, free exercise 
jurisprudence has been a contentious area for decades.11  
In 1963, the Supreme Court held in Sherbert v. Verner 12 that 
strict scrutiny was the appropriate test in assessing laws burdening 
religious freedom.13 The Court concluded that denying unemployment 
benefits to a Seventh-day Adventist who quit her job instead of 
working on Saturday Sabbath imposed a substantial burden on her 
because she had to pick between her job and her faith.14 Applying 
strict scrutiny, the Court held that the government did not have a 
compelling governmental interest and that to deny benefits to the 
plaintiff violated her free exercise rights.15 However, strict scrutiny as 
the standard for free exercise claims came to a screeching halt in 1990 
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith.  
In Smith, the defendants were fired by a drug rehabilitation 
organization because they ingested peyote, a hallucinogenic drug, as 
part of a religious ritual for the Native American Church.16 Oregon 
law prohibited the “knowing or intentional possession of a ‘controlled 
substance’” unless a medical practitioner authorized and prescribed 
such usage.17 The Court concluded that the Free Exercise Clause did 
not preclude the state from prohibiting peyote use for religious 
purposes, and therefore the denial of unemployment benefits was 
constitutional.18 
The Smith Court addressed the change from the previous Sherbert 
standard, which required governmental actions that substantially 
burden a religious practice to be justified by a compelling 
 
9. Id. at 1671–72. 
10. See, e.g., id. at 1674 (arguing against the view that Smith was a radical 
departure from precedent).  
11. Id. 
12. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
13. Id. at 406.  
14. Id. at 404. 
15. Id. at 406–07. 
16. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).  
17. Id.  
18. Id. at 890.  
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governmental interest.19 The Court stated that the Sherbert test had 
been applied to invalidate state unemployment compensation rules in 
three instances, but outside the unemployment-benefit context, the 
Court had never used the Sherbert test to invalidate any govern-
mental action.20 The Smith Court also stated that they “would not 
apply [the Sherbert test] to require exemptions from a generally 
applicable criminal law.”21 Thus, the Smith standard became the basic 
axiom of free exercise jurisprudence. 
B. The Smith Qualifications  
There are three qualifications to the Smith axiom: (1) the Hialeah 
exception, (2) individualized exemptions, and (3) the hybrid-rights 
exception. This Part addresses each road around Smith, emphasising 
the hybrid-rights exception. 
1. The Hialeah Exception 
The one Supreme Court decision that has interpreted and applied 
Employment Division v. Smith is Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 
Inc. v. City of Hialeah.22 In Hialeah, the Court held that a Florida 
ordinance, which barred “[killing] animals for any type of ritual, 
regardless of whether or not the flesh or blood of the animal is to be 
consumed,” was unconstitutional because the law’s clear purpose was 
to prohibit a religious practice.23 The ordinance was enacted as a 
response to the Santeria Church’s announcement that it was estab-
lishing a school, cultural center, and museum to bring its practices, 
including the ritual sacrifice of animals, into the open.24  
The Court ruled that the law was not one of “general 
applicability” because the ordinance did not prohibit other animal 
killings besides religious sacrifice.25 The Court also concluded that the 
law lacked neutrality because its objective was to stop the practice of 
the Santeria religion.26 Since the government could achieve “[t]he 
 
19. Id. at 882–83; see also Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402–03 (holding that 
governmental burdens on free exercise must “be justified by a 
compelling state interest” (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
20. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883 (citing Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals 
Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 
(1981); Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398)). 
21. Id. at 884. 
22. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 
(1993). 
23. Id. at 527, 538.  
24. Id. at 525–26. 
25. Id. at 543. 
26. Id. at 534–35. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 1·2012 
Addressing the Hybrid-Rights Exception 
262 
proffered [public health] objectives” without burdening the Santeria 
practices, the law was unconstitutional.27 Thus, in Hialeah, the Court 
reaffirmed Smith, stating that even though a neutral and generally 
applicable law “has the incidental effect of burdening a particular 
religious practice,” the law does not have to be “justified by a 
compelling governmental interest.”28  
The conclusion of Smith and its application in Hialeah yield the 
current state of free exercise jurisprudence. Even if a law encumbers 
religious practices, as long as the law does not single out religious 
practices for punishment and is not motivated by the desire to interfere 
with the individual’s right to practice the religion, the law will likely be 
considered constitutional under Smith. Free exercise rights are not 
violated by a neutral law of general applicability so long as rational basis 
review is satisfied. Conversely, a law that is not of general applicability 
will be found unconstitutional if it does not meet strict scrutiny.  
2. The “Individualized Exemption”  
The “individualized exemption” qualification to the basic Smith 
rule was discussed in the Smith decision.29 This exception stands for 
the proposition that if a state has a facially neutral law with a system 
of individualized exemptions, then that state may not refuse to extend 
that system of exemptions to cases of religious hardship without a 
compelling reason. The Supreme Court has used Sherbert and Thomas 
as examples of individualized exemption cases because unemployment 
compensation programs involve a system that lends itself to 
individual governmental assessment of the reasons behind an 
applicant’s unemployment.30 In Sherbert and Thomas, a person was 
not eligible to receive unemployment benefits if the individual refused 
to work “without good cause,” and that “good cause” language 
created a mechanism for individualized exemptions.31 The Court 
reasoned that “[i]f a state creates such a mechanism [of individualized 
exemptions], its refusal to extend an exemption to an instance of 
religious hardship suggests a discriminatory intent.”32 With such 
systems allowing individualized governmental review, the Supreme 
Court concluded that the applicable test would be the strict scrutiny 
of Sherbert rather than the rational basis of Smith.33 
 
27. Id. at 546. 
28. Id. at 531 (citing Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)). 
29. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)). 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Roy, 476 U.S. at 708.  
33. Id. at 884–85. 
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3. The Hybrid-Rights Exception 
The “hybrid-rights” exception was first presented in Smith.34 The 
Smith majority surveyed the cases where free exercise challenges were 
upheld in the face of a neutral, generally applicable law’s application 
to religiously motivated action, and none of those cases involved free 
exercise claims alone.35 Justice Scalia, in his Smith majority opinion, 
deemed these cases hybrid-rights cases—ones that might warrant 
heightened scrutiny instead of rational basis review.36 These “hybrid 
situation[s]” were claims where a free exercise action was coupled with 
other assertions of constitutional protection, such as freedom of 
speech or the right of parents to direct the education of their 
children.37 The Smith majority distinguished Smith from these 
“hybrid-rights” cases that used strict scrutiny by noting that the case 
before the Court “[did] not present . . . a hybrid situation, but a free 
exercise claim unconnected with any communicative activity or 
parental right.”38 The Smith Court used Wisconsin v. Yoder as the 
basis for the hybrid-rights exception.39  
In Yoder, the Court upheld claims of free exercise and the right to 
control the education of one’s children and granted Amish parents an 
exemption from compulsory school laws for their fourteen- and fifteen-
year-old children.40 The Court concluded that the Amish objected to 
education beyond the eighth grade because what is taught in schools is 
in “marked variance” with Amish values and way of life.41 The Court 
found that the compulsory attendance laws infringed on the Amish 
 
34. See, e.g., Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 
699 (10th Cir. 1998) (identifying the “hybrid-rights theory discussed in 
Smith”); see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 881–82 (discussing “hybrid 
situation[s]”). 
35. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881–82; see, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 
105, 117 (1943) (invalidating a flat license tax on solicitations when it was 
applied to religious disseminations because it infringed upon both the free 
exercise of religion and the freedom of speech and of the press); Cantwell 
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304–07 (1940) (striking down a licensing 
system that applied to religious solicitations because it violated the Free 
Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment).  
36. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881–82. 
37. Id.; see, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218-19 (1972) (striking 
down application of compulsory school-attendance laws to Amish 
parents because it violated both the parents’ freedom of religion and 
liberty to control the education of their children under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments). 
38. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882. 
39. Id. at 881 (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. 205). 
40. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207, 235–36. 
41. Id. at 210–11.  
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parents’ rights to control the upbringing of their children and that “the 
traditional way of life” for the Amish was “not merely a matter of 
personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared by an 
organized group, and intimately related to daily living.”42 The Court 
concluded that the Wisconsin law “affirmatively” compelled the Amish 
parents, “under threat of criminal sanction,” to act in a way “at odds 
with . . . their religious beliefs” and thus destroyed their free exercise 
rights.43 Therefore, the Yoder Court applied the strict scrutiny standard 
and found in favor of the Amish parents.44 
A review of the free exercise jurisprudence establishes that if a 
claim against a law does not satisfy the requirements of the Smith 
exceptions, then that claim will be evaluated under the rational basis 
review of Smith.45 However, if a claim satisfies one of the three 
qualifications to Smith, a higher level of scrutiny may be implicated. 
If, like Hialeah, a law is not neutral and generally applicable—as 
required for application of the Smith rule—then the law must satisfy 
strict scrutiny.46 Similarly, a law that satisfies the requirements of the 
individualized exemption approach would implicate strict scrutiny as 
well.47 Lastly, as the next Part demonstrates, courts are divided on 
the existence of a hybrid-rights claim and whether such a claim 
triggers strict scrutiny analysis.48  
 
42. Id. at 216.  
43. Id. at 218–19.  
44. Id. at 234–36. 
45. See supra Part I.A. 
46. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520, 531–32 (1993).  
47. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990). 
48. See, e.g., Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that 
accompanying infringements of the right to interstate travel and a right 
to drive by requiring a driver’s license applicant to supply his social 
security number did not violate the Free Exercise Clause under rational 
basis review); Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 
694 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that a school district’s refusal to allow a 
student to attend classes part-time concomitantly did not infringe on 
parents’ right to direct their child’s education and did not implicate the 
hybrid-rights theory). Compare Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 
108 F. Supp. 2d 681 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (applying rational basis review to 
a challenge against school uniforms based on the Free Exercise Clause 
and the right of parents to control the upbringing of their children), 
with Hicks v. Halifax Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 93 F. Supp. 2d 649 (E.D.N.C. 
1999) (applying strict scrutiny to similar claims).  
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II. The Circuit Split: Lower Courts’ Confusion 
Regarding the Hybrid-Rights Exception 
In the wake of Smith, the hybrid-rights exception has split the 
circuit courts.49 Although three major approaches to the hybrid-rights 
exception have been recognized by courts and scholars, a review of the 
lower courts’ decisions and recent case law show that four approaches 
to this theory that have been adopted: (a) the “refusal-to-recognize” 
approach, (b) the “independently-viable-claim” theory, (c) the 
“colorable-claim” approach, and (d) what this Comment terms the 
“open recognition” approach.50  
However, due to recent decisions that have emerged from the 
lower courts, these major approaches have changed form. Further-
more, there are other approaches that scholars have proposed as 
alternatives for addressing the hybrid-rights exception.51 This Part 
addresses each approach in turn.  
A. The Refusal-To-Recognize Approach 
The “refusal-to-recognize” approach has recently branched into 
two camps. The Sixth Circuit refused to recognize the hybrid-rights 
exception, finding the theory to be flawed.52 The Second and Third 
Circuits also have refused to recognize the hybrid-rights exception 
without more direction from the Supreme Court and have character-
ized the theory as non-binding dicta.53  
 
49. Workman v. Mingo Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 419 F. App’x 348, 353 (4th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 590 (2011) (observing that there is a 
circuit split over the validity of this “hybrid-rights” exception). 
50. Benjamin I. Siminou, Note, Making Sense of Hybrid Rights: An Analysis 
of the Nebraska Supreme Court’s Approach to the Hybrid-Rights 
Exception in Douglas County v. Anaya, 85 Neb. L. Rev. 311, 318 & 
n.37 (2006). Siminou does not recognize the “open recognition” approach 
but instead identifies a separate “genuinely-implicated” approach. Id. 
51. See, e.g., id. at 324–26, 340-46 (formally recognizing and arguing for a 
“genuinely-implicated” standard). 
52. See, e.g., Prater v. City of Burnside, 289 F.3d 417, 430 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(reinforcing the rejection of strict scrutiny application to hybrid-rights 
claims); Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993) 
(refusing to apply strict scrutiny or any scrutiny level higher than 
rational basis review to hybrid-rights cases). 
53. See, e.g., Combs v. Homer-Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 246–47 (3d Cir. 
2008) (per curiam) (refusing to apply an undefined hybrid-rights theory 
without further Supreme Court direction); Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 
F.3d 134, 143–44 (2d Cir. 2003) (rejecting the application of strict 
scrutiny, or anything higher than Smith’s rational basis review, to hybrid-
rights cases); Knight v. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156, 167 
(2d Cir. 2001) (interpreting Smith hybrid-rights language as dicta).  
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit initially 
used the refusal-to-recognize approach in Kissinger v. Board of 
Trustees, where it stated that the hybrid-rights exception was 
“completely illogical” because the level of scrutiny should not be 
dependent upon the number of constitutional rights claimed.54 The 
court held that a public university’s policy regarding the school’s 
veterinary-medicine curriculum, which required a course involving 
operations on live animals, did not need to meet any standard stricter 
than the standard in Smith.55 Therefore, the court applied rational basis 
review.56  
This view of the approach is buttressed by Justice 
Souter’s concurring opinion in Hialeah, where he commented on the 
confusion surrounding Smith and the flawed nature of an exception to 
its general rule:  
Though Smith sought to distinguish the free exercise cases in 
which the Court mandated exemptions from secular laws of 
general application, I am not persuaded. . . . And the distinction 
Smith draws [between a pure free exercise case and a “hybrid” 
situation] strikes me as ultimately untenable. If a hybrid claim 
is simply one in which another constitutional right is implicated, 
then the hybrid exception would probably be so vast as to 
swallow the Smith rule, and, indeed, the hybrid exception would 
cover the situation exemplified by Smith, since free speech and 
associational rights are certainly implicated in the peyote ritual. 
But if a hybrid claim is one in which a litigant would actually 
obtain an exemption from a formally neutral, generally applicable 
law under another constitutional provision, then there would have 
been no reason . . . to have mentioned the Free Exercise Clause 
at all.57 
In 2008, the Third Circuit joined this approach by refusing to 
recognize the hybrid-rights theory unless the Supreme Court provided 
more express guidance.58 This view differs from the Sixth Circuit’s 
approach, however, because this take on the refusal-to-recognize 
approach leaves space for the possibility of future hybrid-rights claims 
if the Supreme Court provides more direction. The Second 
Circuit and the Supreme Court of Missouri have also taken this 
refusal-to-recognize view of the hybrid-rights exception, seeing the 
 
54. Kissinger, 5 F.3d at 180. 
55. Id.  
56. Id. 
57. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520, 566–67 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring) (citation omitted).  
58. Combs, 540 F.3d at 247 (“Until the Supreme Court provides direction, 
we believe the hybrid-rights theory to be dicta.”). 
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Smith hybrid-rights language as non-binding dicta but leaving open 
the option to allow future hybrid-rights claims.59  
B. The Independently -Viable-Claim Theory 
In the independently-viable-claim approach to the hybrid-rights 
exception, strict scrutiny is triggered when a free exercise claim is 
accompanied by an independently viable constitutional claim.60 The 
courts that have been thought to take this approach are the United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.61 However, 
whether the First Circuit actually follows the independent viability ap-
proach is debatable. As discussed later, this Comment instead places the 
First Circuit’s line of hybrid-rights cases under a different approach.62  
Thus, the only Court of Appeals that seems to adopt the 
independently viable claim and has not yet expressly changed that 
view is the District of Columbia Circuit. The D.C. Circuit has not 
fully analyzed a hybrid-rights claim, but rather has supported the 
hybrid-rights exception in the form of an independently viable claim 
conjoined with a free exercise claim. In EEOC v. Catholic University 
of America,63 the D.C. Circuit held that a religious ministerial 
exception survived Smith but, if that was an incorrect conclusion, the 
holding was still valid because the plaintiff could use the hybrid-rights 
exception by joining her Free Exercise Clause claim with her 
independently viable Establishment Clause claim.64 In other words, 
the court maintained that a hybrid-rights claim could be brought in 
the future under the independently viable approach. 
C. The Colorable-Claim Standard 
The third major approach is the colorable-claim standard.65 The 
colorable-claim approach requires that a plaintiff with a free exercise 
 
59. See Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 143 (2d Cir. 2003) (rejecting 
the application of strict scrutiny to hybrid-rights cases because “Smith’s 
language relating to hybrid claims is dicta and not binding” (internal 
quotation mark omitted)); see also Blakely v. Blakely, 83 S.W.3d 537, 
547-48 (Mo. 2002) (en banc) (agreeing with the Second Circuit’s rejec-
tion of strict scrutiny). 
60. John L. Tuttle, Note, Adding Color: An Argument for the Colorable 
Showing Approach to Hybrid Rights Claims Under Employment Division 
v. Smith, 3 Ave Maria L. Rev. 741, 754 (2005). 
61. Note, The Best of a Bad Lot: Compromise and Hybrid Religious 
Exemptions, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1494, 1501 (2010). 
62. See infra Part II.D. 
63. EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
64. Id. at 467.  
65. See, e.g., Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 
N.E.2d 459, 464–65 (N.Y. 2006) (rejecting the hybrid-rights approach 
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claim join a “colorable claim” that an accompanying constitutional 
right has also been violated.66 “Colorable” has been taken to mean that 
there is a “‘likelihood,’ but not a certitude, of success on the merits.”67  
The colorable-claim approach arose from the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Swanson v. Guthrie 
Independent School District No. I-L.68 The Tenth Circuit concluded 
that, even though Smith was not clear about the application of the 
hybrid-rights exception, for a hybrid-rights claim to be brought there 
had to be “at least [a] . . . colorable showing of infringement of 
recognized and specific constitutional rights, rather than mere 
invocation of a general right.” 69 In other words, a colorable claim did 
not require a certain violation of an accompanying constitutional right 
but did require more than a general allegation.70 However, the Tenth 
Circuit did not actually apply the hybrid-rights exception because the 
plaintiffs did not meet the showing of a colorable claim.71  
The colorable-claim approach was also adopted by the Ninth 
Circuit, which concluded in a line of cases that a colorable claim of an 
accompanying constitutional violation served to hybridize the com-
panion claim with the plaintiffs’ free exercise action.72 The Ninth 
Circuit in Miller v. Reed held that to assert a hybrid-rights claim, “a 
free exercise plaintiff must make out a ‘colorable claim’ that a 
companion right has been violated—that is, a ‘fair probability’ or a 
‘likelihood,’ but not a certitude, of success on the merits.”73  
 
because the claim of free speech in addition to the free exercise challenge 
was “insubstantial”). 
66. Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Thomas v. 
Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692, 703, 707 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
67. Thomas, 165 F.3d at 707. 
68. Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 
1998). 
69. Id. at 700. 
70. Id. 
71. Id.; see also Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 
F.3d 643, 655–56 (10th Cir. 2006) (rejecting plaintiff’s hybrid-rights 
claim, but reaffirming the colorable-claim approach because the inquiry 
is fact-driven and must be examined on a case-by-case basis). 
72. See Thomas, 165 F.3d at 704–05 (applying the colorable-claim test after 
an in-depth analysis of the other available approaches). Thomas was 
ultimately overturned en banc because of lack of ripeness. Thomas v. 
Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). See 
also Axson-Flynn v. Jonson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1297 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(affirming the Thomas standard and using the colorable test because it 
is a middle ground solution); Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207–08 
(9th Cir. 1999) (affirming the standard set out in Thomas). 
73. Miller, 176 F.3d at 1207–08 (quoting Thomas, 165 F.3d at 703, 707).  
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D. “Open Recognition” Approaches 
A fourth approach that the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth 
Circuit Courts of Appeals have taken is defined by this Comment as 
the “open recognition” approach. This approach is characterized by a 
court openly recognizing the hybrid-rights exception, not taking any 
of the other specific approaches outlined above, and applying its own 
approach. Within this “open recognition” category, the circuit courts’ 
analyses of hybrid-rights claims fall into three sub-categories: (1) 
interdependent considerations, (2) per se delineations, and (3) com-
pletely open approaches.  
1. Interdependent Considerations 
The First Circuit initially approached the hybrid-rights exception 
by requiring an independently viable constitutional claim, but it 
altered its approach in a 2008 decision. The First Circuit, in Brown v. 
Hot, Sexy & Safer Productions, Inc., held that a hybrid-rights claim 
is not triggered unless a plaintiff joins a free exercise challenge with 
another independently viable constitutional claim.74 The Brown court 
found that the plaintiffs’ claims did not bring them within the hybrid-
rights exception because the plaintiffs’ alleged parental prerogative 
and family-relations claim did not state a privacy or substantive due 
process claim.75 Thus, since the free exercise claim was not conjoined 
with an independently protected constitutional claim, the plaintiffs 
did not have a viable hybrid-rights action.76 Rejecting the plaintiffs’ 
free exercise challenge, the court reasoned that their claim was distinct 
from that of hybrid-rights cases like Yoder. The court distinguished 
the Brown plaintiffs from the Yoder plaintiffs because the Brown 
plaintiffs did not allege that the one-time compulsory attendance law 
threatened their entire way of life, whereas the Amish parents in 
Yoder persuasively demonstrated the sincerity of their religious be-
liefs, the interrelationship of their religious beliefs with their way of 
life, the vital role that the religious belief played in their community, 
and the dangers presented by the State’s enforcement of this generally 
applicable compulsory education law.77 
Recently, however, the First Circuit in Parker v. Hurley held that 
the plaintiffs’ assertion that their sincerely held religious beliefs were 
deeply offended was not enough to reach the level of a hybrid-rights 
claim because the plaintiffs had not described a constitutional in-
 
74. Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 
1995).  
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972)). 
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fringement of their rights or those of their children.78 The First 
Circuit sought to stay as closely as possible to the Court’s analysis 
in Yoder, stating that the Yoder Court did not analyze the due 
process and free exercise interests of the parent-plaintiffs separately, 
“but rather considered the two claims interdependently, given that 
those two sets of interests inform one other.”79 Thus, the First Circuit 
with Parker has moved towards an interdependent considerations 
approach when reviewing the coupling of constitutional claims rather 
than analyzing each claim separately.  
2. Per Se Delineations 
The Fifth Circuit in Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman 
openly recognized the hybrid-rights exception, finding that Smith spe-
cifically exempts “religion-plus-speech” cases from the broad sweep of 
its holding.80 The plaintiff argued that being forced to state an oath 
or affirmation violated not only her freedom of religion but also her 
freedom of speech.81 Thus, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the plain-
tiffs presented a viable hybrid-rights claim through a per se rule of 
specific delineations outlined by the Supreme Court.82  
3. Completely Open Approaches 
The Seventh Circuit, in Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City 
of Chicago, stated that “in cases implicating the Free Exercise Clause 
in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom 
of speech and freedom of association, the First Amendment may 
subject the application to religiously motivated action of a neutral, 
generally applicable law to a heightened level of scrutiny.”83 However, 
the Seventh Circuit ultimately held that the speech, assembly, and 
equal protection claims before the court individually lacked the merit 
needed to withstand summary judgment, so the plaintiffs could not 
establish a hybrid-rights claim.84 Thus, the Seventh Circuit did not 
follow the “refusal-to-recognize” approach and instead openly 
recognized the hybrid-rights theory by citing Smith’s hybrid-rights 
language. But the Seventh Circuit did not expressly take the 
 
78. Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 99 (1st Cir. 2008).  
79. Id. at 98 (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213–14, 232–34).  
80. Soc’y of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman, 939 F.2d 1207, 1216 (5th Cir. 
1991) (citing Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877–78, 881 (1990)). 
81. Herman, 939 F.2d at 1215.  
82.  Id. at 1216–17. 
83. Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 764 
(7th Cir. 2003) (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 881–82).  
84. Urban Believers, 342 F.3d at 765–67. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 1·2012 
Addressing the Hybrid-Rights Exception 
271 
“independently viable” approach or the “colorable-claim” approach.85 
Since the Seventh Circuit resolved this case by stating that the 
appellants could not satisfy any requirements for the hybrid-rights 
claim, it did not need to decide if strict scrutiny was met. 
The Eighth Circuit in Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings 
took a slightly different route by openly recognizing the hybrid-rights 
exception but not choosing which standard to apply.86 The district court 
rejected the hybrid-rights claim brought before it by granting summary 
judgment to the City on the Church’s free speech, freedom of association, 
equal protection, and due process claims. The Eighth Circuit reversed the 
district court’s summary judgment, concluded that this brought the 
hybrid-rights claim back to life, and directed the district court to 
consider this claim on remand.87 Furthermore, in a more recent decision, 
the Eighth Circuit stated that “[s]trict scrutiny [is] the appropriate 
analysis . . . under the ‘hybrid rights doctrine.’”88  
III. Arguing for the Exception:  
A Novel Legal Approach  
Although many lower courts have recognized the hybrid-rights 
exception, some courts have not taken a stance in the hybrid-rights 
controversy. Several circuit courts and legal scholars have expressed 
considerable confusion and criticism about the purpose and mechanics 
of the hybrid-rights exception.89 But the hybrid-rights qualification to 
the Smith rule serves a purpose, and this Part will argue for the full 
recognition of the hybrid-rights exception, evaluate the outlined 
approaches, and advocate for the colorable-plus approach, which uses 
the interdependent-considerations analysis as a twist.  
 
85.  Id. 
86. Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 472–73 
(8th Cir. 1991).  
87. Id. at 474. 
88. Olsen v. Mukasey, 541 F.3d 827, 832 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding that strict 
scrutiny applied to the plaintiff’s free exercise claim paired with an 
equal protection claim). 
89. See Combs v. Homer-Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 246 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(per curiam) (adopting the refusal-to-recognize approach due to the lack 
of defined standards). Compare Michael E. Lechliter, Note, The Free 
Exercise of Religion and Public Schools: The Implications of Hybrid 
Rights on the Religious Upbringing of Children, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 2209, 
2220–21 (2005) (arguing that Yoder bolsters free exercise protection 
through hybrid rights), with Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise 
Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1109, 1121–22 
(1990) (contending that the Smith Court developed hybrid rights solely to 
distinguish Yoder). 
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A. Policy Arguments for Full Recognition of the Hybrid-Rights Exception  
In Smith, Justice Scalia emphasized that free exercise claims 
present some unique challenges, including that courts tend to delve 
inappropriately into “the effects of a governmental action on a 
religious objector’s spiritual development” and the centrality of the 
religious beliefs.90 To address these issues, Justice Scalia articulated 
the broad Smith rule—that free exercise challenges against neutral 
laws of general applicability do not warrant heightened scrutiny and 
thus the government need only satisfy rational basis review.91 Along 
with this broad rule, Scalia discussed the hybrid-rights exception, 
whereby heightened scrutiny is implicated when a free exercise claim 
is conjoined with another constitutionally protected claim.92  
The hybrid-rights exception, like the Smith holding, keeps courts 
from delving into an individual’s religious sensitivities, focusing 
instead on the constitutional rights and provisions in question, as 
many constitutionally protected rights are tied up in religious be-
liefs.93 Additionally, considerations of judicial economy support bol-
stering the hybrid-rights exception. Requiring that the free exercise 
claim be coupled with another constitutional right (1) keeps frivolous 
free exercise claims from being brought, preventing the courts from 
being clogged, (2) conserves litigation time, and (3) decreases costs 
and expenses for parties and the courts.  
B. Evaluating Other Approaches 
In evaluating each approach outlined above, it is evident that one 
approach far surpasses the others, even though each theory has its 
advantages and drawbacks. The first two approaches toward the hybrid-
rights exception—the “refusal-to-recognize” and “independently-viable-
claim” approaches—are not viable because they are legally or logically 
fallible. The “open-recognition” approach, which splits into the mere 
recognition and the per se approach, also is not the best approach 
because it produces vague or limited results. Thus, the best approach is 
the “colorable-claim” approach with the utilization of interdependent 
considerations—the “colorable-plus” approach. 
 
90. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (quoting Lyng v. Nw. 
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988)).  
91. Id. at 882. 
92. Id. 
93. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218-19 (1972) (describing 
the pervasive effect of compulsory education statute on Amish 
community); Olsen, 541 F.3d at 832 (describing a hybrid-rights claim 
that alleged both free exercise and equal protection violations); Civil 
Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 765 (7th 
Cir. 2003) (describing a hybrid-rights claim that alleged free exercise, 
speech, assembly and equal protection violations).  
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1. Arguing Against the Refusal-to-Recognize Approach 
The Sixth Circuit’s refusal to recognize the hybrid-rights excep-
tion contradicts the Smith decision and conflicts with the approaches 
of the Second and Third Circuits. The Smith decision distinguished 
itself from Yoder and other cases where strict scrutiny had been the 
standard by saying the latter were “hybrid” cases.94 In other words, 
the hybrid-rights exception was explicitly created in Smith.95 Thus, 
ignoring the hybrid-rights qualification to the Smith axiom effectively 
ignores the Court’s conclusion in Smith. In the line of cases identified 
in Smith, the Court struck down laws that would otherwise have 
satisfied the Smith requirements for a generally applicable and neutral 
law because the laws violated both the Free Exercise Clause and other 
constitutional guarantees.96 Thus, the holdings of these cases were not 
in conflict with Smith because they were hybrid-rights cases—whereas 
the only claim in Smith was a free exercise claim. Indeed, the Court 
stated in Yoder that a law may be invalidated for violating the Free 
Exercise Clause even if the law was “neutral on its face” and “of 
general applicability,” and the Court expressly recognized this when it 
developed the hybrid-rights theory in Smith.97 Thus, the Sixth Circuit’s 
approach marks a dramatic departure from Supreme Court precedent.  
The Second and Third Circuits’ refusal to recognize the approach 
without further direction from the Supreme Court is similarly 
undesirable because the Court in Smith provided enough information 
to carry the hybrid-rights exception to a logical conclusion. As 
discussed below, the colorable-plus approach, or the colorable-claim 
theory with interdependent considerations, successfully implements 
the hybrid-rights exception as outlined by the Court in Smith, as it 
adequately addresses judicial concerns and balances those challenges 
with supporting individual constitutional rights.98  
 
94. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881–82. 
95. Id. 
96. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218–19 (exempting persons of the Amish faith 
from a compulsory education law because the statute infringed the 
Amish parents’ religious beliefs and their parental right to raise their 
children); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108–10 (1943) 
(invalidating a flat tax on religious solicitations because the system 
violated both religious beliefs and free speech rights); Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) (invalidating a licensing system 
for religious and charitable solicitations on free exercise and Fourteenth 
Amendment due process grounds). 
97. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220; see Smith, 494 U.S. at 881–82. 
98. See infra Part III.C; see also Lu, supra note 2 (providing an application 
of the hybrid-rights exception in the context of compulsory school 
vaccination law and showing how a colorable-claim approach would work).  
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Refusal to recognize the hybrid-rights exception has also been 
based on the fear that, if recognized, it would swallow the Smith 
rule.99 This concern is ameliorated by the number of cases—including 
a Supreme Court case—where a hybrid-rights claim failed, even in the 
face of strict scrutiny. 
The Smith Court cited Prince v. Massachusetts,100 not in support 
of hybrid-rights claims, but rather in support of the Smith holding.101 
The Prince Court, in the face of strict scrutiny, upheld child labor 
regulations against a woman who allowed her children to distribute 
and sell magazines that preached the works of Jehovah’s Witnesses.102 
Prince stated that “Massachusetts has determined that an absolute 
prohibition, though one limited to streets and public places and to the 
incidental uses proscribed, is necessary to accomplish its legitimate 
objectives.”103 These objectives included “[a]cting to guard the general 
interest in youth’s well being.”104  
Because there is precedent that hybrid-rights claims may potentially 
fail even in the face of strict scrutiny analysis, Prince refutes the idea 
that the hybrid-rights exception would swallow the rule. Furthermore, if 
there truly were no exceptions to the Smith rule, then the Free Exercise 
Clause would not have any meaning left. Thus, courts should follow 
Supreme Court precedent and recognize the hybrid-rights exception. 
2. Arguing Against Two of the Open Recognition Approaches 
After establishing that the hybrid-rights exception should be 
recognized, the next step is to determine the manner in which it should 
be implemented. One option would be to follow the “open recognition” 
approach from the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Society of Separationists, 
 
99. See Church of the Lukumi Babablu Aye, Inc., v. City of Hialeah, 508 
U.S. 520, 567 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring) (“If a hybrid claim is simply 
one in which another constitutional right is implicated, then the hybrid 
exception would probably be so vast as to swallow the Smith rule.”). 
100. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).  
101. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879–80 (discussing cases in which “the right of free 
exercise [did] not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 
valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law 
proscribes . . . conduct that his religion prescribes.” (quoting Prince, 321 
U.S. at 171) (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
102. Prince, 321 U.S. at 170–71. 
103. Id. at 170; see id. at 173-74 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (stating that “[t]he 
burden was therefore on . . . Massachusetts to prove the reasonableness 
and necessity of prohibiting children from engaging in religious activity 
of [this] type” and “[i]f the right . . . to practice . . . religion in that 
manner is to be forbidden by constitutional means, there must be 
convincing proof that such a practice constitutes a grave and immediate 
danger to the state or to the health, morals or welfare of the child”).  
104. Id. at 166 (majority opinion). 
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Inc. v. Herman.105 In Herman, the Fifth Circuit outlined a per se 
approach, where a hybrid-rights claim exists if a free exercise claim is 
coupled with a constitutional claim that the Supreme Court has 
expressly recognized as a claim that, when coupled with a free exercise 
claim, is exempt from Smith’s broad holding.106 Such a per se approach 
would have to outline a finite list of constitutional claims.  
This approach is more desirable than the “refusal to recognize” 
approach, as this route recognizes that the hybrid-rights exception is part 
of Supreme Court jurisprudence. But this approach is too narrow. The 
list of constitutional claims would be a small list, likely including freedom 
of speech claims, freedom of association, and the right to raise one’s 
children. Furthermore, if the list was finite and could not be lengthened, 
it would defeat the purpose of the flexibility of due process and other 
constitutional claims. Alternatively, if the list was finite but could be 
lengthened, then that result would lessen the value of a per se rule. Thus, 
the results to the per se approach seem extreme and limited.  
The “open-recognition” approach adopted by the Seventh and 
Eighth Circuits is also undesirable, as the courts recognized the 
hybrid-rights exception but provided no additional insight or clarity 
to the hybrid-rights standard.107  
3. Arguing Against the Independently-Viable-Claim Theory 
The next approach, the independently viable claim, is logically 
flawed. The independently-viable-claim theory is not a suitable approach 
because if each claim can be brought independently and is viable on its 
own, then the existence of a hybrid-rights exception is not needed.108 The 
plaintiff could just bring each claim forward on its own.  
C. Arguing for the Colorable Claim Requirement—with a Twist 
Although the independently viable claim seems to be similar to 
the colorable-claim approach, there is a fundamental and important 
distinction between the two that makes the colorable-claim approach 
considerably more desirable. Central to the colorable-claim approach 
 
105. Soc. of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman, 939 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1991); 
see also Part II.D.2 (discussing Herman).  
106. Herman, 939 F.2d 1216–17 (finding that Smith expressly excluded 
“religion-plus-speech” cases from its holding). 
107. See Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 
764–65 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that heightened scrutiny may apply in 
hybrid-rights cases, but ultimately deciding that this was not such a 
case); Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 472–
73 (8th Cir. 1991) (openly recognizing the hybrid-rights exception, but 
refusing to set a standard to apply). 
108. See Vineyard Christian Fellowship of Evanston, Inc. v. City of Evanston, 
250 F. Supp. 2d 961, 989 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (describing the independently-
viable-claim theory as effectively eliminating the hybrid-rights exception). 
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is the assumption that requiring a successful claim under a separate 
constitutional provision would nullify the hybrid-rights exception. 
Thus, the colorable-claim approach effectively resolves the issue that 
makes the independently viable claim fallible. The colorable-claim 
approach is also stronger than the refusal-to-recognize approach 
because the latter ignores the fact that Justice Scalia discussed the 
hybrid-rights idea in Smith, and it thus represents a departure from 
Supreme Court precedent.109  
Furthermore, the colorable-claim approach has been litigated 
successfully, whereas the other approaches have not. In Vineyard 
Christian Fellowship of Evanston, Inc. v. City of Evanston, the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that a church 
that demonstrated a free exercise claim coupled with a colorable 
infringement of free speech and equal protection successfully brought 
a hybrid-rights claim, and that the appropriate scrutiny was strict 
scrutiny.110 In Vineyard, the church brought an action against the 
city, challenging the city’s use of a zoning ordinance to prohibit the 
church from conducting worship services.111 The court noted that 
since the church “demonstrated that its free speech and equal 
protection rights [had] been violated, . . . [this] case [was] arguably 
analogous to those cited in Smith as involving hybrid rights.”112 Since 
the court had already applied strict scrutiny to the zoning ordinance 
in question in the equal protection context, the court just reiterated 
its earlier conclusion that the city had failed to demonstrate that the 
law in question was narrowly tailored to the city’s proffered goals.113 
Thus, a federal district court implemented the colorable-claim 
approach and came to a viable result that echoed the Supreme 
Court’s previous constitutional analysis.  
Although the colorable-claim approach led to a federal judicial 
decision that was buttressed by a different constitutional analysis 
yielding the same result, there are certainly arguments against the 
logic of the colorable-claim approach.114 Criticism of the colorable-
claim standard includes the argument that this approach combines 
two distinct losing claims and produces a winning claim, which makes 
“zero plus zero equals one” when “in law as in mathematics zero plus 
 
109. See Note, supra note 61, at 1505 (criticizing the colorable-claim 
approach). For Justice Scalia’s language about the hybrid-rights theory, 
see Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 & n.1 (1990). 
110. Vineyard, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 989. 
111. Id. at 963–64. 
112. Id. at 989. 
113. Id. 
114. See Note, supra note 61, at 1505 (criticizing the colorable-claim 
approach). 
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zero equals zero.”115 Henderson presented the concern: “[A]lthough the 
regulation does not violate the Free Exercise Clause, and although 
[there is] no viable First Amendment claim against the regulation, the 
combination of two untenable claims equals a tenable one.”116 In other 
words, the Henderson court criticized the hybrid-rights exception as 
“mak[ing] something out of nothing.”117  
But the First Circuit in Parker refuted Henderson’s criticism as 
unfounded, stating that “it is equally true that the sum of a number 
of fractions—one-half plus one-half, for example—may equal one.”118 
The First Circuit further stated that “[i]n the criminal law, we have 
recognized that at times the cumulative effect of a series of individual 
rulings, none of which individually constituted error, could mean the 
trial was not fair.”119 The First Circuit recognized that this criminal 
law example was not perfectly analogous.120 But an important 
consideration, as seen in Parker and many other legal contexts, is the 
“totality of the circumstances,” in which the “whole is greater than 
the sum of its parts.”121 There are many situations where, if examined 
in black and white, it would appear that zero plus zero equals one, 
but sometimes the individualized parts can cumulatively form a larger 
 
115. Id. at 1501, 1504–05 (quoting Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12, 19 
(D.C. Cir. 2001)). The phrase “the whole is greater than the sum of its 
parts” even draws support from physics, as demonstrated by strong 
emergence theory, invented by a Nobel Prize–winning physicist. Cf. 
Robert B. Laughlin, A Different Universe: Reinventing Physics 
from the Bottom Down, at xiv (2005) (“What physical science thus 
has to tell us is that the whole being more than the sum of its parts is not 
merely a concept but a physical phenomenon.”). 
116. Henderson, 253 F.3d at 19 (citations omitted).  
117. Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 98 n.13 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing 
Henderson, 253 F.3d at 19).  
118. Id. at 99 n.13 (quoting Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise Is Dead, Long 
Live Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi, and the General Applicability 
Requirement, 3 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 850, 858 (2001)).  
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. Cf. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1989) (using the “totality” 
standard in Fourth Amendment analysis by stating that, “[a]ny one of 
these factors is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct[,] . . . [b]ut we 
think taken together they amount to reasonable suspicion”); LaVine ex 
rel. LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989–90 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(employing the “totality” standard in a First Amendment free speech 
context, where each set of facts seen individually was not substantial but 
the weight of the whole picture justified the school district’s action against 
a student’s speech); In re Meyer, 467 B.R. 451, 458 & n.4 (Bankr. E.D. 
Wis. 2012) (providing another constitutional context where totality of the 
circumstances is used, even though it is regarding the right to direct the 
education and upbringing of the debtors’ children in a bankruptcy case).  
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whole. This reasoning gives rise to the “totality of the circumstances” 
standard, which is prevalent in numerous cross-sections of law—
including constitutional law.122  
The “totality” viewpoint is not only acceptable in this context but 
also desirable. The First Circuit highlighted that “parental rights and 
the free exercise of religion by parents are interests that overlap and in-
form each other, and thus are sensibly considered together.”123 The 
First Circuit recognized that these constitutional claims are inherently 
related and intertwined. This result is also a middle ground that en-
sures that not all plaintiffs who wish to combine their free exercise 
action with a constitutional claim get their case heard, but that cases 
that should be reviewed at a higher standard than rational basis are de-
cided under the appropriate standard. Under this approach, the court 
holds the power to determine which cases are worthy of the hybrid-
rights exception. Furthermore, the colorable-claim approach is consistent 
with the Yoder decision on which the hybrid-rights exception is based.124 
Thus, the First Circuit reveals the twist to the colorable-claim 
approach: only colorable constitutional claims that are intertwined 
with the free exercise of religion are sufficient to support a hybrid-
rights claim. The court in Henderson misinterpreted the hybrid-rights 
exception. The hybrid-rights exception does not operate to turn two 
untenable constitutional claims into one that is tenable. Instead, the 
hybrid-rights exception defines the circumstances under which a free 
exercise claim is tenable. This analysis synthesizes the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Yoder and Smith, the colorable-claim approach, 
and the First Circuit’s interdependent considerations rationale in 
Parker, and the result is that a free exercise claim is tenable when a 
viable free exercise claim is brought with a colorable claim, limited to 
the companion claims that the Smith majority stated merited 
heightened scrutiny.125 These hybrid-worthy companion claims include 
freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the right of parents to direct 
and control the upbringing of their children, and freedom of 
association.126 The accompanying claim requires “at least . . . a 
colorable showing of infringement of recognized and specific 
constitutional rights,” where “the claimed infringements are 
genuine.”127 After Yoder, Smith, and Parker, the free exercise claim in 
conjunction with a colorable claim, taken together in “totality,” 
 
122. See supra note 121. 
123. Parker, 514 F.3d at 99 n.13.  
124. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 208–09, 213 (1972). 
125. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990).  
126. Id. 
127. Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 699–700 
(10th Cir. 1998).  
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amount to a viable hybrid-rights claim that warrants heightened 
scrutiny. This approach seems to provide the best alternative to an 
otherwise amorphous and vague legal framework for addressing free 
exercise claims. 
The “colorable-plus” approach to the hybrid-rights exception 
recognizes a class of free exercise claims worthy of special considera-
tion and reserves all other free exercise claims to the lower standard 
of review set forth in Smith. This special consideration is not 
warranted simply by the assertion of a separate constitutional 
violation. Rather it is the assertion of a restriction on free exercise 
that is inextricably and logically bound with a restriction on another 
constitutionally protected activity.  
The difference can be illustrated using the situation where parents 
refuse to follow compulsory school-vaccination laws to immunize their 
child. For parents who have a genuine religious belief against vac-
cinating their child, two constitutional claims are implicated: a First 
Amendment free exercise claim and a Fourteenth Amendment sub-
stantive due process claim for the freedom to raise one’s child.  
Although each claim may not be independently viable, the combined 
claim viewed in totality is viable under the colorable-plus approach.  
The two claims inform each other and are inextricably bound, as the 
parents object to the inoculation of their child because of their 
religious beliefs. In this situation, even if each claim cannot survive on 
its own, the existence of the free exercise claim, the additional 
colorable constitutional claim, and their interdependent nature re-
quires that this type of free exercise claim receive more than the 
limited review outlined in Smith.    
If a case brought before a court is viewed as a hybrid-rights case 
under the colorable-claim approach, the next inquiry asks what level 
of scrutiny applies. Although there has been uncertainty as to 
whether the hybrid-rights exception implicates strict scrutiny, the 
language in Smith implies that a hybrid-rights case can, but does not 
have to, trigger strict scrutiny.128 There are two reasons why the 
appropriate standard in this type of hybrid-rights case is strict scrutiny.  
 
128. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3 (“Our conclusion that generally applicable, 
religion-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a particular 
religious practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental 
interest is the only approach compatible with these precedents.”). 
A concern may be whether the colorable-plus approach would then 
always implicate strict scrutiny. However, under this standard, a 
cognizable claim has to have both a free exercise claim and a colorable 
accompanying constitutional claim. See, e.g., Grace United Methodist 
Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 655–59 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(providing an example of a case where three separate constitutional 
claims accompanying the free exercise claim, including free speech and 
association, due process, and equal protection, were rejected as not 
meeting the “colorable” standard in the colorable-claim approach); 
Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207–08 (9th Cir. 1999) (providing 
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First, the colorable-claim approach only works if the scrutiny level 
triggered is strict scrutiny. If parties making a hybrid-rights claim 
have to claim both that a law infringed upon their religious belief and 
that it also impinged upon another fundamental constitutional right, 
then the plaintiffs would face an additional obstacle only to trigger 
the same degree of scrutiny that would result from the companion 
claim alone. This would be an absurd result that the majority opinion 
in Smith likely did not intend. Thus, strict scrutiny should be the 
requisite scrutiny level if a successful hybrid-rights claim is brought 
before the court.  
Second, a hybrid-rights case would be legally analogous to Yoder, 
which used the compelling governmental interest as the level of 
scrutiny.129 While a law of general and neutral applicability is 
presumptively valid, when a hybrid-rights case is put forth that is 
sufficiently similar to Yoder, the validity of the general and neutrally 
applicable law is questioned, and the totality of such a hybrid-rights 
case should trigger strict scrutiny.130 
Conclusion 
Free exercise jurisprudence in many ways is similar to other types 
of constitutional law, including other areas of First Amendment 
jurisprudence. There have been points of punctuated equilibrium with 
the Supreme Court’s free exercise jurisprudence, and finally the 
Supreme Court seems to have solidified a few aspects. The Supreme 
Court set forth a basic rule, the Smith axiom, and like other types of 
First Amendment jurisprudence, the Court qualified the rule with 
several exceptions and qualifications. One such exception is the 
hybrid-rights exception.  
 
another example of when a plaintiff’s hybrid-rights claim using the 
colorable claim approach failed because his accompanying constitutional 
claim did not meet the “colorable” standard). Such a constitutional 
claim under this approach would be limited to constitutional claims that 
the Supreme Court has declared worthy as a basis of a hybrid rights 
suit. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. These companion claims include freedom of 
speech, freedom of the press, the right of parents to direct the 
upbringing of their children, and freedom of association. Id. at 881–82. 
In the future, the Supreme Court could decide that other constitutional 
claims may be conjoined with a free exercise claim to successfully produce 
a hybrid-rights claim. However, the limitation provides a standard that is 
not so low of a threshold that any accompanying constitutional claim 
would implicate strict scrutiny. 
129. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215. (“We can accept it as settled, therefore, that, 
however strong the State’s interest in universal compulsory education, it 
is by no means absolute to the exclusion or subordination of all other 
interests.”).  
130. Id.  
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The hybrid-rights exception as outlined in Smith is unclear.131 But 
the Supreme Court’s language is clear enough to provide some 
guidance. Since the freedom to raise children and other important 
constitutional rights arise from the Due Process Clause, these 
constitutional concerns are meant to be flexible. Thus, adhering 
tightly to Yoder, as some have suggested, might not be the best 
approach.132 Molding tightly and narrowly to the Yoder decision takes 
away from the dynamic body of law that is due process and other 
constitutional areas.  
The hybrid-rights analytical framework gives birth to a tenable 
free exercise claim if the free exercise action is conjoined with another 
constitutional claim that is aligned with Supreme Court precedent. 
The analytical framework starts with the basic maxim in Smith that, 
for a neutral and generally applicable law, rational basis review is the 
appropriate level of scrutiny when dealing with free exercise claims.133 
But that basic axiom is qualified in the situation where a free exercise 
claim is coupled with other constitutional claims that the Supreme 
Court has indicated are sufficient to implicate the hybrid-rights 
exception. Upon evaluating the major approaches taken by lower 
courts, including recent updates, the best approach is the colorable-
claim approach plus interdependent considerations because this route 
(1) does not ignore the Supreme Court, (2) is logically sounder than 
any other approach, and (3) has proven to yield sound results. Using 
this altered colorable-claim approach, which this Comment terms the 
colorable-plus approach, one must conclude that the conjugation of the 
free exercise claim and an accompanying constitutional claim—in 
totality—warrants strict scrutiny. 
The hybrid-rights exception balances protecting individual lib-
erties with giving state governments their police powers. As a rule, 
the hybrid-rights exception softens the harsh Smith maxim and 
preserves a fundamental freedom that otherwise would have little 
clout: the freedom to exercise one’s religion. The hybrid-rights excep-
tion works with the Smith rule to keep courts from diving into 
 
131. Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law § 12.3.2.3, at 1215–16 (2d 
ed. 2002) (“Lower courts have done relatively little to clarify when a 
claim should be regarded as ‘hybrid’ under Smith.”).  
132. Cf. Note, supra note 61, at 1500 (explaining that the Supreme Court 
decides complex cases which sometimes requires obscure line drawing 
and the Court must be allowed to distinguish a case from the one prior 
to it).  
133. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (“[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an 
individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of 
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or 
prescribes) conduct that his religions prescribes (or proscribes).’” 
(quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Sevens, J., 
concurring))); see also supra Part I.  
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individuals’ religious sensitivities. Instead, the hybrid-rights doctrine 
allows courts to focus on the fundamental rights in question, as many 
constitutionally protected rights are tied up in religious beliefs. The 
hybrid-rights theory also balances accepting worthy free exercise 
claims and keeping frivolous free exercise claims out. Since Justice 
Scalia decided to include hybrid-rights exceptions in the Smith 
decision, he and the other Justices in the majority must have envi-
sioned a way for hybrid-rights claims to proceed.134 Without the 
hybrid-rights exception, the Free Exercise Clause would have little 
meaning. The colorable-plus approach provides that meaning. 
Hope Lu † 
 
134. See Lu, supra note 2 (applying the hybrid rights exception as well as the 
colorable-plus approach to the compulsory school vaccination law 
context).  
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